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COMMENT
THE USE OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION BY
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ARBITRATORS
[A]n Arbitrator decides cases exactly in the way my dear Grandma
(on my Mother's side, that is) bought mushmelons at the fruit store.
This was in the days before all those fancy cantaloupes, honeydews,
Persian melons, and Casaba melons. What ever happened to the
mushmelon, anyway? At any rate, she would ask the clerk to select
some good melons for her. Then she would regard and inspect them
with a fishy, skeptical, and cynical expression; and she would pro-
ceed to reject them out of hand on the sound theory that anything he
tried to palm off on her as a good melon must be a bad one, ipso
facto. She would then stretch to reach for melons, high in the fruit
bin, and dig for others at the bottom of the pile. After subjecting
them to rigorous visual inspection ("quality control," they now call
it in our electronic plants), she would pick one out for color. This
mushmelon she would then heft, musingly, in her hands for weight
and volume. Then she would gently press the ends with her thumb,
with just enough pressure to ascertain the ripeness and maturity of
the fruit. Then, she would raise the mushmelon to her nose and
delicately sniff its fragrance. And finally, she would draw upon a
rich and varied lifetime of experience in selecting mushmelons - an
experience marked by some few outstanding successes and by many
disastrous and inexplicable goofs and bobbles. At this stage, all of
the objective standards and tests would be abandoned as inadequate
or transcended. She would turn her back on the evidence of her
senses and choose to rely upon the ineffable and completely subjec-
tive criteria for judgment that are acquired only with living and cop-
ing with a problem for a long time .... The more one thinks about it,
the more one gets persuaded. But if you should ask me (and I have a
right to assume that you would) how an arbitrator makes his deci-
sions, I should answer you - exactly as my Grandma chose
mushmelons!
- Peter Seitz i
1. Peter Seitz, How Arbitrators Decide Cases: A Study in Black Magic, PROC. OF THE 15TH
ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 159, 164 (1962).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Seitz will forever be remembered as the author of the most famous
sports-related arbitration case, the Messersmith-McNally Major League
Baseball grievance, in which both plaintiffs were declared free agents in
1975.2 I am sure that Arbitrator Seitz would be the first to admit that arbi-
trators' methods are slightly more exacting than his Grandma's. Everyone
who interprets a contract - judges, lawyers, law professors, students and
arbitrators - uses standards of interpretation to support their conclusions.
Some theorists believe the standards should not be heavily relied upon, as
they are inherently contradictory and "are useful only as facades, which an
occasional judge may add lustre to an argument persuasive for other rea-
sons." 3 In the specialized field of professional sports grievances, standards
of interpretation take on greater importance. They are pillars drawn upon
to support the arbitrator's decision. The standards serve as the tools the
arbitrators employ to balance the interests of the athlete, the entertainer,
and the employee within the boundaries of the collective bargaining
agreement.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the methods of statutory or
contract interpretation used by arbitrators in professional sports grievances.
The most effective way to do this is through analysis of actual awards. Pub-
lished sports arbitration or grievance awards are difficult to find. As such,
this paper will refer specifically to three decisions: a 1992 National Hockey
League opinion, a 1987 Major League Baseball opinion, and a 1990 Major
League Baseball opinion. All three cases deal with contract interpretation
between labor and management.
The labor dispute is a natural consequence of the American enterprise
system in which workers organize into unions and negotiate with manage-
ment in collective bargaining.4 These disputes reflect each side's determina-
tion to receive what is perceived as an equitable amount of the profits
earned by their collective efforts.' They also demonstrate the seriousness of
the collective bargaining agreement, and the parties' desires that the guide-
lines of the collective bargaining agreement be enforced absolutely. The
underlying reason for arbitration is to avoid costly production stoppages,
such as strikes, and to provide a forum for discussion between the parties.6
2. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615 (8th Cir. 1976) (aff'g Seitz's decision).
3. FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY, LEGISLATION - CASES AND MATERIALS 654
(1955).
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In the increasingly complex world of professional sports, arbitration has
been the most effective means of avoiding costly litigation between parties,
although some issues still do find their way into the courts.7
Strictly speaking, arbitration is a "simple proceeding voluntarily chosen
by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of their
own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the case, they
agree in advance to accept as final and binding."8 Professional athletics
exemplifies an industry which quickly turned to arbitration after the intro-
duction of collective bargaining.9 Among its many advantages, arbitration
claims the focused expertise of a specialized tribunal.10 The costly and
bulky procedures of the courts are not well adapted to the particular needs
of labor-management relations.1 Arbitration gives the parties a specialized
tribunal, a forum in which the decision-makers are as familiar with the is-
sues as the adversaries.12 Given the complexity of the issues that surround
a professional sports collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator's
knowledge of the issues is critical.
Arbitration is normally the final segment of a labor dispute settlement
under collective bargaining agreements.13 Collective bargaining between la-
bor and management is not confined to the formal making of a collective
bargaining agreement once every few years, but rather, is a daily process in
which the grievance plays an important role.14 The grievance procedure is
usually well defined in the collective bargaining agreement. Usually, all
preliminary negotiation between the parties in an attempt to settle the dis-
pute must be exhausted before the case goes to arbitration.15 A sample of
this framework is found within the current Major League Baseball Basic
Agreement (collective bargaining agreement):
B. Procedure
7. Mark L. Goldstein Comment, Arbitration of Grievance and Salary Disputes in Professional
Baseball: Evolution of a System of Private Law, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1049 (1975).
8. Matthew N. Chappell, Arbitrate.., and Avoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 ARB. MAG., Nos. 11-12,
(1944).
9. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7.
10. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 7.
11. Clark Kerr, More Peace - More Conflict, PROC. OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 8 (1976).
12. Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a Judge,
PROC. OF THE 35TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 16 (1983).
13. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 153.
14. Chrysler Corp. v. UAW, 10 War Lab. Rep. (BNA) 551, 554 (1943).
15. For a discussion of the effect and exhaustion of preliminary negotiations upon the role
and jurisdiction of the arbitrator, see In re Picture Frame Workers Union, 8 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1063 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); In re Aluminum Co. of America, 12 War. Lab. Rep. (BNA)
446 (1943).
1993]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Step 1. Any Player who believes that he has a justifiable Grievance
shall first discuss the matter with a representative of his Club desig-
nated to handle such matters, in an attempt to settle it. If the matter
is not resolved as a result of such discussions, a written notice of the
Grievance shall be presented to the Club's designated representative,
provided, however, that for a Grievance to be considered beyond
Step 1, such written notice shall be presented within (a) 45 days
from the date of the occurrence upon which the Grievance is based,
or (b) 45 days from the date on which the facts of the matter became
known or reasonably should have become known to the Player,
whichever is later. Within 10 days following receipt of such written
notice (within 2 days if disciplinary suspension or a grievance in-
volving Player safety and health), the Club's designated representa-
tive shall advise the Player in writing of his decision and shall
furnish a copy to the Association. If the decision of the Club is not
appealed further within 15 days of its receipt, the Grievance shall be
considered settled on the basis of that decision and shall not be eligi-
ble for further appeal. 6
In other words, arbitration is the end to the whole grievance procedure,
which is a continuing collective bargaining process itself.
Before analyzing how arbitrators use interpretation to decide griev-
ances, it is necessary to define what constitutes a grievance. A grievance is
a disagreement, dispute, conflict or irritation between two parties. The dis-
pute is usually between labor, either individually or collectively, and man-
agement.1 7 A grievance could be defined as any type of complaint by an
employee or union against the employer, or vice versa, under the rights
and/or duties of the collective bargaining agreement. I" Under a collective
bargaining agreement, a grievance is literally anything that the parties say it
is.19 For example, the Major League Baseball Basic Agreement provides:
"Grievance" shall mean a complaint which involves the existence or
interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement, or any provi-
sion of any agreement, between the Association and the Clubs or
any of them, or between a Player and a Club, except that disputes
relating to the following agreements between the Association and
the Clubs shall not be subject to the Grievance Procedure set forth
herein.20
16. Major League Baseball Basic Agreement, at 29 (1990).
17. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 155.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Major League Baseball Agreement, at 26.
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The fact that parties find it necessary to define the term "grievance" within
their collective bargaining agreement illustrates the widespread disagree-
ment among labor relations authorities as to the exact meaning of the
term.21
As the Baseball Agreement suggests, a grievance may arise from any
infinite number of causes, as long as it pertains somehow to the Agreement.
One arbitrator expressed how broad a grievance definition generally is:
"Whether a man has a grievance or not is primarily his own feeling about
the matter. Generally speaking, if a man thinks he has a grievance, he has a
grievance." 22 The courts have agreed with this notion. In fact, one court
explained that "a liberal and broad construction should be given to the term
'grievance' in the interest of encouraging the use of machinery which the
parties themselves have set up for the peaceful settlement of disputes."23
II. ARBITRATION - THE LAST RESORT
As mentioned previously, when the parties have exhausted all other set-
tlement negotiations, they turn to the final forum to settle the dispute: arbi-
tration. Once the parties reach arbitration, the arbitrator alone has the fate
of the dispute in his hands.2 4 The arbitrator, like any other magistrate,
must decide a labor dispute on its merits, weighing the evidence, listening to
testimony, and wading through the written record.
No function of the labor dispute arbitrator is more important than his
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.25 Only when the agree-
ment, or part of it, is ambiguous will there be a need for contract interpreta-
tion.26 If words are "plain and unambiguous" there is no need for the
arbitrator to resort to methods of contract interpretation to settle the dis-
pute.27 Even if the language of the agreement is clear and plain on its face,
ambiguity may still exist. Arbitrators refer to those situations "where the
language appears clear on its face but becomes unclear when an effort is
21. For citations to varying interpretations of the term 'grievance' see ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
supra note 4, at 156, n.10.
22. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Packinghouse Workers Local 55, 7 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 645,
646 (1947) (Fisher, Arb.).
23. Forrest Industries Inc. v. Local Union No. 3-436, International Woodworkers of
America, 381 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1967).
24. For example, Major League Baseball uses an "Arbitration Panel" consisting of three per-
sons to decide its arbitration cases.
25. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 342.
26. Id.
27. Continental Conveyor Co. v. Aluminum Workers Local 295, 51 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1023 (1968) (McCoy, Arb.); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters
Local 347, 36 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 391 (1960) (Pollock, Arb.).
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made to apply it to a given (fact) situation" as "latent ambiguity."28 In the
case of latent ambiguity, the arbitrator must determine the rights and intent
of the parties under the agreement as if the agreement provision was ambig-
uous.29 Most arbitrators consider agreements ambiguous where "plausible
contentions may be made for conflicting interpretations. "30
Very few collective bargaining agreements are considered unambiguous
by arbitrators. The reason for this is that "[e]ven the most experienced
negotiators cannot anticipate all the conditions and variations which can
arise under a particular provision of the labor agreement."31 The fact that
almost all collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration demon-
strates that the parties realize that some language of the contract may be
inherently ambiguous and that they could not possibly provide for all situa-
tions that may arise during the life of the agreement.32 Even the most
skillfull drafters cannot anticipate all the conditions and variations which
may arise under a single provision. Arbitration is the most sensible way to
fill in the gaps after the labor agreement is finished.33
III. THE USE OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION BY THE ARBITRATORS
A. Intent - The Ultimate Goal
The arbitrator's ultimate goal, when faced with a legitimate grievance
under a collective bargaining agreement, is to determine and carry out the
mutual intent of the parties at the time they drafted the agreement. 34 An
ambiguity within the collective bargaining agreement can arise where the
parties did not express their intent clearly enough or where the parties did
not foresee a particular fact situation arising under the agreement.3 5 Situa-
tions also occur where the parties never gave any thought to the fact situa-
tion that has arisen. When any of these situations occur, it is up to the
arbitrator to construct some form of "intent" where none existed. 6
28. In re Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 198, 199 (1977) (Bern-
stein, Arb.).
29. Id.
30. Armstrong Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. United Rubber Workers Local 164, 17 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 741, 744 (1952).
31. W. C. Stoner, Comment, PROC. OF THE 26TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF
ARa. 80, 81 (1974).
32. Loew's, Inc. v. Office Employee's Local 174, 10 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 227, 232 (1948)
(Aaron, Arb.).
33. Stoner, supra note 31, at 81.
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When called upon to determine the intent of the parties and the rights
under the agreement, arbitrators use accepted standards of construction to
interpret the agreement and its terms. 7 It should be noted that all written
instruments, constitutions, statutes, contracts, and collective bargaining
agreements are interpreted by the same general principles, although the spe-
cific subject matter may be strictly or liberally construed.3 8 Contract inter-
pretation allows the arbitrator to address the question of what the contract
means on its face, through analysis of the contract's language. However,
the language used often does not express the exact intent of the parties.39
When this is the case, it is often necessary to examine the circumstances
surrounding how and why the language of the agreement was chosen by the
parties, including what the parties said and what information they used
during the negotiation process.
B. Language - The Most Basic Tool of All
The arbitrator must determine the meaning of the agreement and the
intent of the parties.4' The language of the agreement itself is the arbitra-
tor's most basic tool and enables him or her to make this determination. In
Major League Baseball Grievance 88-1, Arbitrator George Nicolau wrote
that "in any contract interpretation case.., the Panel must first look to the
language of the provision at issue."41 The arbitrators generally presume
that the parties' negotiators are experienced and realize the implications of
the language that they chose to express their intent in the agreement. 42
Therefore, the language of the agreement is the single most important tool
an arbitrator can use to give himself an idea of what the parties were think-
ing when they drafted the agreement.43
Arbitrators use a number of contract interpretation standards and apply
them to the language or words of the agreement. These standards are flexi-
ble.' They are "aids to the finding of intent, not hard and fast rules to be
used to defeat the intent of the parties."' 45 Arbitrators use these standards
of contract construction as guides to interpret the contract provision.
37. E.g., Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon v. Amalgamated Transit Unit, 68 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1369, 1370 (1977) (Tilbury, Arb.).
38. Smith Steel Workers v. A.O. Smith Corp., 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2044 (7th. Cir. 1980).
39. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 342.
40. Id. at 348.
41. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Clubs 1, 16
(1990) (Nicolau, Arb.).
42. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 227 (1938).
43. Id.
44. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 344.
45. Republic Steel Corp., 5 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 609, 614 (1946) (McCoy, Arb.).
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One standard used by arbitrators is the plain meaning rule. The plain
meaning rule provides that the meaning of the provision should be deter-
mined by looking within the four corners of the agreement, i.e., the docu-
ment's language itself, and that the arbitrator cannot ignore the clear-cut
meaning of the contractual language.46 If the language of the document is
clear and unambiguous on its face, arbitrators generally agree that the pro-
vision must be interpreted without the aid of extrinsic evidence and must be
given the meaning that is clearly expressed.47 In an arbitration, usually at
least one party will urge the arbitrator to look at the plain meaning of the
contract. This was the situation in Baseball Grievance 88-1, where "the
Clubs urge[d] the Panel to 'reject' the Association's 'invitation to look only at
the plain language of Article XVIII(H) and ignore evidence concerning...
intent and effect.' "48 The Association attempted to gain an edge by urging
the Panel to look at the plain language of the provision. The provision had
read:
H. Individual Nature of Rights
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this Article XVII[
is an individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and
each Club for his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in concert
with other Players and Clubs shall not act in concert with other
Clubs.49
If the Panel applied the plain meaning rule to this provision, the Clubs
could not introduce evidence of intent, effect, bargaining history, and the
conduct of the parties over the years. All of this extrinsic evidence would
be rendered useless if a strict plain meaning rule were applied. However,
the plain meaning rule is generally not applied if reasonable persons could
disagree as to the intent and meaning of the provision.50 Thus, a strict plain
meaning rule, and exclusion of extrinsic evidence, is not commonly used in
professional sports arbitration cases."1
Another standard of construction, one that is frequently used, is the
process of giving the language of the agreement the ordinary and popular
46. Clean Coverall Supply Co. v. Laundry Workers Local 108, 47 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 272
(1966) (Whitney, Arb.).
47. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Workers Local
446, 16 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 229 (1951) (Justin, Arb.).
48. Grievance 88-1, supra note 41, at 16.
49. Id. at 3; Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Baseball
Clubs A-123, A-124 (1987) (Roberts, Arb.) (emphasis added).
50. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 344.
51. See National Hockey League Grievance, Average League Salary (1992) (St. Antoine,
Arb.); Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Clubs 1 (1990)
(Nicolau, Arb.).
[Vol. 3:215
THE USE OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
meaning. 2 Under that standard, words and phrases are given their ordi-
nary, everyday meaning absent some indication from the parties that an-
other meaning was intended.5 3 Dictionary definitions are often used to
determine ordinary and popular meanings of words.54 For example, when
looking for a relationship between the words "salary" and "periodically,"
Arbitrator Theodore St. Antoine used this method in his National Hockey
League arbitration. St. Antoine said that "[p]eriodicity is plainly an ele-
ment in the standard dictionary definition of salary," citing, Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, 1693 (2d ed. unabr. 1983); Webster's
New International Dictionary, 2203 (2d ed. unabr. 1983). ss This method is
often expanded to the contract provision as a whole, where the arbitrator
will interpret the entire provision to give it an "ordinary and popular"
meaning. An example can be found in Major League Baseball Grievance
86-2, where Thomas Roberts interpreted the ordinary meaning of Article
XVIII(H), dispute dealing with player free agency. Roberts said:
The provision declares that the utilization or non-utilization of free
agency shall be an individual matter determined solely by each
player and club for his or its benefit. With regard to free agency,
players may not act in concert with other players and clubs may not
act in concert with other clubs.5 6
After giving meaning to the words or provision of the agreement, the
arbitrator can then look to the specific facts of the dispute and how they are
affected under the agreement. For example, in the Baseball disputes, after
giving meaning to the language, the arbitrators will look to the conduct of
the owners and whether or not that conduct violated the provision in ques-
tion. Before analyzing the specific conduct of the owners, Roberts
explained:
in the context of the present inquiry any agreement or plan involving
two or more of the clubs and governing the manner in which they
will or will not deal with free agents is contractually forbidden ....
A common scheme or plan directed to a common benefit is in viola-
tion of the bargain of the parties.57
52. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 350.
53. Vlasic Foods v. United Dairy Workers Local 87, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1214, 1217
(1980) (Lipson, Arb.).
54. Cincinnati Post & Times Star v. Cincinnati Newspaper Guild Local 9, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 129, 138 (1977) (Chalfie, Arb.).
55. Hockey Grievance, supra note 51, at 12 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1693 (2d ed. unabr. 1983); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 2203 (2d ed. unabr. 1983).
56. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs
A-123 (1987) (Roberts, Arb.).
57. Id.
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Arbitrator St. Antoine used a similar method to arrive at an acceptable
definition of "average player salary." In the National Hockey League
Grievance, St. Antoine wrote: "[t]here is a well-accepted approach when
one is trying to strike an average among a group of variable factors, so as to
give effect to all the factors and yet take appropriate account of their
variations."58
C. Context - The Most Important Tool
Another important standard in interpreting the language of a collective
bargaining agreement is the use of context.5 9 Meaning can be given to am-
biguous or doubtful provisions by construing them in the light of the con-
text of the agreement." Noscitur a socis is an old maxim that summarizes
the rule both of language and of law that the meaning of words and provi-
sions may be controlled by those with which they are associated.61 Agree-
ment language cannot be interpreted within a factual vacuum. In a labor
grievance situation, if the agreement provision is ambiguous, the arbitrator
must look to other sources for guidance.62 The language being interpreted
by the arbitrator must be considered in the context of all the other words
and provisions by which it is surrounded. In other words, the contract
must be interpreted as a whole document.63 If the arbitrator chooses to use
extrinsic evidence, context will allow the arbitrator to use the history of the
parties' bargaining relationship," the nature of the industry or business, 65
and all other relevant circumstances surrounding the subject dispute. In
the arena of professional sports arbitration, context is the most important
standard used by the arbitrators. The complexity of the issues involved in
professional sports demands that the arbitrators give the most weight to
58. Hockey Grievance, supra note 51 at 10.
59. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 356.
60. Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. International Ass'n. of Machinists Dist. Lodge 169, 85 Lab.Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1190 (1985) (Statham, Arb.); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers of
America Local 510, 20 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 880 (1953) (Gorder, Arb.).
61. 4 Samuel Williston & Walter H.E. Jaeger, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 618 (3d
ed. 1961).
62. Firestone Synthetic Rubber and Latex Co., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 968 (1981) (Vil-
liams, Arb.).
63. Anaconda Co. v. Uranium Metal Trades Council, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 345, 347
(1980) (Gowan, Arb.).
64. For discussion see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at Chapter 12 entitled "Custom
and Practice." Elkouri states that the "use of past practice to give meaning to ambiguous contract
language is so common that no citation of arbitral authority is necessary." However, Elkouri does
note that "the weight to be accorded past practice as an interpretation guide may vary greatly
from case to case." Id. at 451-52.
65. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 360-61.
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contextual arguments. Although each of the arbitrators discussed in this
comment uses his own style in reaching a decision, all three arbitrators rely
heavily on context.
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF ACTUAL AWARDS
A. St. Antoine's NHL Grievance Award
In the arbitration of National Hockey League Players Association and
The National Hockey League Member Clubs, Gr: "Average League Salary,"
Arbitrator St. Antoine faced the task of finding the meaning of the term
"average League salary." More specifically, the issue in the grievance was:
What constitutes "average League salary" with respect to the
agreed-upon language (of the collective bargaining agreement) that
reads: "A player who has completed ten professional seasons or
more (Minor or NHL) and who in the last year of his contract did
not earn more than the average League salary, can elect once in his
career to become an unrestricted free agent at the end of his con-
tract." (The parties have agreed previously that the term "ten pro-
fessional seasons or more [minor or NHL]" does not include junior
hockey and hence the parties have no dispute before the arbitrator
concerning this subject.)66
The issue above was substantially agreed to on April 10, 1992, and was
presented to the arbitrator on July 23, 1992, when the parties realized that
there was no definition of average League salary on which they could
agree.67 In fact, testimony before Arbitrator St. Antoine alleged that there
was "no specific discussion of the meaning of average League salary" and
"no specific discussion of any formula for determining the average sal-
ary." 68 Both the players and the clubs had their own idea of what the term
meant. Then-NHL President John Ziegler said "[average salary] got to be
kind of a joke between us... [the] Players Association had their average
salary. And we had our average salary. And we agreed to disagree.
' 69
During the dispute, each side argued how the other defined "average
League salary."
The players argued that throughout the 1991-92 collective bargaining
negotiations the League calculated average salary on the money received by
the top 20 players on each team. This figure was determined to be $379,000
for the 1991-92 season. 70 The players alleged that the League used this as
66. Hockey Grievance, supra note 51, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 3.
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"a core element in its overall economic presentation accompanying its bar-
gaining proposals to the Association (Players)."71 Contrary to this, the
League alleged that the parties "never intended that the term 'average
League salary' would be limited to the average of only the 'top' 20 players
on 21 teams in the National Hockey League."7 2 The League pointed out
that, during collective bargaining, the players insisted that the average
League salary was less than the figures cited by the League, i.e., the figures
using only the top 20 players on each team.7 3 Therefore, the League as-
serted, and Ziegler testified, that "the average League salary was under-
stood by . . .the Association, in the context of ten-year free agency, to
encompass everybody playing in the League, not just the top 20 per
team."74 The League maintained that to include all the players who played
"made much more sense" since "all of these players [had] contribute[d] to
the product."75
Cleverly, St. Antoine pointed out the irony that "each side is now insist-
ing essentially on promoting the meaning of 'average League salary' that it
strongly resisted during the whole course of the 1991-92 negotiations."76
Not only is this ironic, but it was critical to St. Antoine's ultimate finding.77
It is important to note that the standard of context encompasses the theory
that where the meaning of a term within an agreement is ambiguous, the
parties intended it to have the same meaning as that given it during the
negotiations leading up to the agreement.78 St. Antoine used the standard
of context and specifically referred to the past bargaining positions of the
parties to reach his conclusion that neither side made clear to the other the
meaning it was attributing to the phrase.79 On this basis, St. Antoine re-
jected the standard that would call for him to assign one of the pre-agree-
ment meanings to average League salary. Within his award, St. Antoine
noted that, within professional sports arbitration, "all sides should be wary
71. Id.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id.
78. Genova Penn., Inc., 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 475 (1992) (DeLauro, Arb.); N-Ren Corp.
v. Oil Workers Local 6-662, 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 438, 442 (1983) (Boyer, Arb.); Maine
Employment See. Comm'n v. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 17, 19-20
(1980) (Babiskin, Arb.).
79. Hockey Grievance, supra note 51, at 7.
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about transporting the terminology employed in those exchanges (precon-
tract negotiations) into important provisions of a contract."8
Finally, St. Antoine used one other important standard of interpretation
in reaching his decision: avoidance of a harsh, absurd, or nonsensical re-
sult.8 Arbitrators strive to give language a construction that is reasonable
and equitable to both parties, especially when the positions of the parties
would lead to an absurd result.82 St. Antoine noted that each party's ap-
proach to "average League salary" would yield an incorrect figure: "just as
the Association's approach would skew the average upwards, the League's
would tilt it downwards."83 He explained that "a reasonable person would
find a serious flaw in the interpretation of both parties."84 In other words,
the definitions provided by the parties would produce a nonsensical result in
this case. Having dispensed with the definitions provided by the parties, St.
Antoine set out to find "a reasonable meaning" to be "assigned to the lan-
guage they chose as an expression of their agreement."85 Using equity and
reason to reach a sensical result, St. Antoine found that "average League
salary" should be "based on the salaries of all the individuals who play in
one or more games in the NHL during a season, but it should be a weighted
average, taking into account the number of games played by each individ-
ual."86 In reaching this decision, St. Antoine, like Nicolau and Roberts,
relied on his experience and the standards of interpretation to reach an eq-
uitable and sensical result. Most importantly, St. Antoine determined the
meaning of "average League salary" within the context of ten-year free
agency in the National Hockey League, and the issues that surround that
particular provision of the agreement.
B. Robert's Baseball Grievance Award
In the Major League Baseball grievance decision, "Grievance No. 86-
2," Arbitrator Thomas T. Roberts evaluated the claim of the Major League
Baseball Players Association that the Clubs and Owners had "'been acting
in concert with each other with respect to individuals who became free
80. Id. at 8.
81. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 354.
82. John Morrell & Co. v. United Food Workers Local 304A, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1017, 1022 (1981) (Nathan, Arb.); Fort Pitt Steel Casting Division v. United Steelworkers Local
1406, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 909, 911 (1981) (Sembower, Arb.).
83. Hockey Grievance, supra note 51, at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13.
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agents under Article XVIII after the 1985 season.' ,7 Again, the contract
provision Roberts had to deal with was Article XVIII(H) of the Major
League Baseball Basic Agreement. That Article expressly provides:
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this Article XVIII
is an individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and
each Club for his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in concert
with other Players and Clubs shall not act in concert with other
Clubs. 8
In his analysis, Roberts examined the history behind the agreement pro-
vision. He noted that the language cited above was "originally proposed by
the Clubs during the 1976 negotiations in response to a fear that individual
players might join to 'package' or sell their newly created free agency
rights."8 9 Looking at the history behind the language, another of the meth-
ods of interpretation commonly used by arbitrators, Roberts gained insight
into the parties' original intent when they drafted the provision. He con-
cluded that the provision was drafted to "recognize[ ] the tradition of indi-
vidual salary negotiations in major league baseball but it is designed to
guarantee that individual players negotiate with individual clubs."90
The grievance in 86-2 centered around the free agent activities that took
place during the 1985-86 baseball off-season. 91 The players alleged that
"what occurred in the free agency market during the 1985-86 off-season
[w]as a 'boycott' in which all twenty-six major league clubs participated
with an intent to destroy free agency. '92 The players claimed this action by
the Clubs violated Article XVIII(H) of the Basic Agreement. In their de-
fense, the Clubs argued that the inactivity of free agents during the 1985-86
off-season "was nothing more than the culmination of a predictable evolu-
tion to a more sober and rational free agent market." 93 They argued that
no agreement existed between the Clubs and that each Club "made rational
independent decisions regarding the employment of free agents, decisions
based upon legitimate baseball, business management and financial factors"
to limit their financial spending in the off-season.94 The Clubs also made a
87. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs
A-123 (1987) (Roberts, Arb.).
88. Id. at A-124.
89. Id. Roberts also noted that the players demanded the Clubs be subject to the same re-
straint, thus creating the final language that appears in the Agreement.
90. Id.
91. Id. at A-125.
92. Id. at A-126.
93. Id. at A-126.
94. Id.
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more fundamental and pragmatic argument that the free agent "pool" in
that particular year was not very attractive to the teams.95
Early in his decision, Roberts discussed the meaning, intent, and appli-
cation of the provision at issue. He interpreted the language within the
context of free agency, and its history preceding the off-season of 1985-86.96
Roberts explained his definition of the provision and then examined the
facts of the specific grievance to determine if a violation of the parties'
agreement had occurred. According to Roberts, the context of this case
demanded that Article XVIII(H) prohibit "any agreement or plan involv-
ing two or more of the clubs and governing the manner in which they will
or will not deal with free agents."9 7 Having defined the Agreement provi-
sion, Roberts detailed the history of the free agent market and the events
leading up to the 1985-86 off-season.98
The events of the 1985-86 off-season were termed by Roberts as "the
sudden and abrupt termination of all efforts to secure the services of free
agents from other clubs." 99 No free agent received any offers from other
Clubs until his former Club declared a lack of interest in re-signing the
player. Roberts used "context," specifically the history of the free agent
industry, to determine if the off-season conduct of the Clubs was a violation
of their collective bargaining agreement. He found that "[o]nly a common
understanding that no club will bid on the services of a free agent will"
provide assurance that a free agent will remain with his original club with-
out a bidding war and "[t]his, in itself, constitutes a strong indication of
concerted action." 1" In his discussion, Roberts compared the off-seasons
of 1984-85 and 1985-86. In 1984-85, twenty-six of the forty-six free agents
changed clubs during the off-season. This could be considered a normal
free agent season. In 1985-86, only four of thirty-two possible free agents
signed with different teams, and only one received an offer from a new club
before his former club was no longer interested.101 The Clubs argued that
the condition of the free agent market in 1985-86 was the result of a general
feeling among the owners that highly paid free agents with long-term con-
tracts did not play well.102 They also argued that despite this feeling, free
agent salaries were still very attractive to the players as clubs offered gener-
95. Id.
96. Id. at A-127.
97. Id.
98. Id. at A-127-135.
99. Id. at A-128.
100. Id. at A-130.
101. Id. at A-132.
102. Id. at A-129.
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ous salaries to their own free agents because of a fear that other clubs might
lure them away.10 3 Roberts rejected this argument as illogical and inconsis-
tent with the existence of a free market. 14.
Arbitrators often use custom and past practice of the parties as evidence
to provide the basis for rules included in the contract, to support amend-
ments to the original contract, or to indicate the proper interpretation of
language within the contract. 105 Along these lines, Roberts pointed to the
rhetoric of owners and the commissioner at meetings immediately before
and during the off-season of 1985-86. Statements such as Clubs should "ex-
ercise more self discipline in making their operating decisions"' 1 6 and "[ilt
is not smart to sign long-term [free agent] contracts,"' 1 7 provided Roberts
with enough evidence of the Clubs' intent to find a violation of Article
XVIII(H) of the Basic Agreement.
Roberts' decision, unlike St. Antoine's, had a only small amount of pro-
vision interpretation, concentrating more on the analysis and history of the
parties' actions. This difference is attributable to the different fact situa-
tions of each grievance, demonstrating the need for flexibility on behalf of
the arbitrator. However, both arbitrators did rely heavily on context and
the unique issues that surround professional sports.
C. Nicolau's Baseball Grievance Award
In "Grievance 88-1," George Nicolau was faced with the same contract
provision as Roberts, Article XVIII(H) of the Major League Baseball Basic
Agreement. In 86-2, Roberts had found that the Clubs violated the provi-
sion during the 1985-86 off season. In 87-3, Nicolau had found that the
Clubs had acted in concert to restrain the free agent market during the
1986-87 off season, again violating the same Agreement provision."0 8 ]In 88-
1, Nicolau was faced with the same question: did the Clubs' conduct violate
Article XVIII(H)?
The facts in this grievance were very different from those in 86-2. At
the center of this dispute was an Information Bank ("Bank") set up by the
Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee ("PRC") in the fall of
103. Id. at A-133-34
104. Id. at A-134.
105. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 437.
106. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs
A-123, A-136 (1987) (Roberts, Arb.).
107. Id. at A-137.
108. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Twenty-Six Major League Clubs 1 (1990)
(Nicolau, Arb.).
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1987.109 Through the Bank, Clubs could advise the PRC of salary offers
they were making to free agents and could learn what, if any, offers were
being made by other Clubs. 11 The Players argued that the Bank's purpose
and effect was to lower free agent salaries and depress the market.", The
Clubs, on the other hand, argued that the Bank stimulated free agent com-
petition and eliminated secretive inter-club discussions to which the players
have always objected. 12 Unlike Roberts, Nicolau had to apply the intent
and meaning of Article XVIII(H) to a scenario, the creation of the Bank,
that the parties never anticipated. Nicolau noted that this "centralization
of information" was unlike any exchange baseball had ever seen.1 13
In a very thorough decision, Nicolau described the Bank in great detail.
He said that the:
[U]se of the Bank, whether for reporting offers made to free agents
or seeking information on what offers had already been made, was
voluntary. Second, the Bank was only to receive and record actual
offers, not possible offers or expressions of interest. Third, those op-
erating the Bank . . . were not to comment on offers or the lack
thereof, nor seek out bidding information except at the request of a
Club seeking to confirm such information, including what an agent
had told its representatives.1 14
The Clubs said the Bank was established to eliminate secretive discussions,
but as extrinsic evidence showed, many Clubs used the Bank to track the
offers of other Clubs to determine just how much they would have to spend
to get a particular player."1 ' Although many aspects of the Bank remained
unclear to Nicolau, it was clear the Clubs had never before exchanged so
much information about free agent bidding. 16
Unlike the off-seasons of 1985 and 1986, the 1987 off-season saw "nor-
mal" free agent activity. Fifteen of seventy-six free agents had offers from
more than two clubs.' 17 In nearly every free agent case, the player's salary
substantially increased. 1 " However, the players argued that there was
"something wrong" with the market and, upon filing a grievance, con-




113. Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id. at 9-10.
117. Id. at 10.
118. Id. at 11.
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cluded the Bank was limiting the free agent market.' 1 9 The players argued
that the Bank violated the "plain" language of Article XVIII(H) and that
the Bank's purpose and effect violated the intent of Article XVIII(H). 20
The players said the action of recording bids in the Bank could not be
"'solely... for [a Club's] ... own benefit...' " as XVIII(H) required, but
was for the mutual benefit of other Clubs. 21 The players argued that a
Club could not help itself by revealing bidding information to other
Clubs. 22 They argued that the plain meaning rule should apply and that
the Bank should be declared a per se violation of XVIII(H). 23 However,
Nicolau was reluctant to apply a strict plain meaning approach. Instead he
used a liberal approach, concentrating on the intent of XVIII(H) and the
effect of the Bank upon the free agent system in light of the context of the
relationship between the players and Clubs.
The players further argued that the Bank was established to allow the
Clubs to aid each other in negotiations and to restrict the players' salaries,
especially those of free agents. 124 The Clubs, on the other hand, maintained
that the Bank was designed to enhance salary competition and to protect
the Clubs from the crafty agent who fraudulently inflated offers a player
had received in an attempt to raise his client's salary.1 25 The Clubs also
argued that neither the prior actions of the parties nor the bargaining his-
tory of Article XVIII prohibited the type of information exchange contem-
plated by the Bank.26 They argued that previous grievance cases
demonstrate that the exchange of information within the Bank has little or
no effect upon the free agent market and, therefore, cannot be a violation of
XVIII. 127
In constructing his decision, Nicolau first analyzed the language of the
provision within the context of the Bank's implementation. 2 Nicolau rec-
ognized that the language of XVIII(H) could not be taken literally because
any form of free agent bidding has "collective implications."' 129 Neither
players nor Clubs negotiate independently. Rather, they often "seek advice
119. Id. at 13.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 16-17.
129. Id. at 17.
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and counsel before taking particular steps."1 30 However, Nicolau distin-
guished these common cases from the particular action in this case. The
PRC established the Bank as "an undisclosed mechanism through which all
major league clubs could transmit, receive, share and act upon free-agent
bids." 131 Nicolau came to the conclusion that such a Bank clearly fit within
the prohibitive language, "acting in concert," of XVIII(H).13 2 The Clubs
had relied on the fact that the drafters of XVIII(H) did not contemplate the
exchange of such information and therefore could not have possibly in-
tended to ban such an exchange. 133 Nicolau conceded this argument, not-
ing that there was virtually no discussion on such an issue. However,
Nicolau did assert his power as an arbitrator by saying that:
"[T]his failure of either Party to expressly allude to something.., in
the negotiations ... does not justify a conclusion that the Bank can-
not fall within the provision's proscription. The meaning of a clause
is rarely drawn from what is unsaid; it is derived from the words
parties use to embody their understanding.1 3 1
Nicolau went on to note that in previous grievance cases, the Clubs had
argued against the conclusion which they were now arguing in this case. 131
Like St. Antoine in the Hockey Grievance, Nicolau found that the par-
ties "agreed to disagree" as to the meaning of XVIII(H). 136 Negotiations to
change the language of XVIII(H) had failed in the past and the players
attempted to change the language, but no acceptable form could be found.
The Clubs argued that this was evidence that XVIII(H) was never intended
to prohibit the exchange of this type of information because, if this was not
the case, the players would have no other motivation to change the provi-
sion. 1 37 The players contended that they were not trying to change the
meaning of the provision, they were just "seeking language" that would
more clearly spell out the intent.138 Nicolau sided with the players, con-
cluding that "the [Players] Association was not seeking something it
130. Id.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 19.
135. Id. at 19-20. The Clubs argued that there was no difference between the Bank and the
advice and information the Association and the PRC began giving players after the 1976 negotia-
tions and that if the latter is not prohibited, as the Clubs had argued, then neither is the former.
136. Id. at 21-23.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id.
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thought it didn't have, but was seeking to clarify what, in its view, the lan-
guage already meant."'' 3 9
Like Roberts in 86-2, Nicolau based his decision largely upon the con-
text in which the facts arose. In this case, it was the Information Bank.1 °
Nicolau found that the Bank was an extreme break from the past conduct
of the parties. 4 ' First, it was a secretive, centralized operation created by
the Clubs through which they could obtain precise salary and contract-re-
lated information.142 Second, even though the players were "dimly aware"
of inter-club communication in the past, the Bank was a totally different
operation. 11 The PRC recommended that all Clubs use the Bank and ac-
tively encouraged Club participation. Thus, Nicolau asserted that the Bank
could not reasonably be perceived to be "a narrowing" of what went on
before or "a mere exchange of information." 1"
Given the scope of the Bank within the context of free agency and the
process of salary negotiations, Nicolau found that the Bank was inconsis-
tent with the intent of XVIII(H), to have Clubs use rights under the provi-
sion for their own benefit.' 45 Finally, Nicolau dismissed the Clubs'
argument that the Bank could not be found to violate XVIII(H) if the Bank
was not intended to restrain the free agent market. 146 He found no logical
reason to believe that the Bank was designed to stimulate free agent compe-
tition. Nicolau stated that there could be "little question that the Informa-
tion Bank was intended to affect free agent salaries and intrude on the free
agency process. It does so by its very nature... [I]t is evident that the Bank
was not established to offer free agents more money than achievable with-
out a Bank." 147 Nicolau reasoned that the Bank was inspired by Roberts'
decision in 86-2, and in that context "the Bank's message was plain - if we
must go out into that market and bid, then let's quietly cooperate by telling
each other what the bids are. If we all do that, prices won't get out of line
and no club will be hurt too much."' 148 When Nicolau looked at the Bank
in its proper context, against the backdrop of free agency, he found that it
violated the meaning and intent of XVIII(H): to promote the individual-
139. Id.





145. Id. at 27.
146. Id. at 28.
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id. at 31.
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ized bargaining system and forbid the parties "to act in concert" when nego-
tiating player contracts. 149
V. CONCLUSION
St. Antoine, Roberts, and Nicolau have their unique styles, but all three
arbitrators are more alike than different. As arbitrators, their primary ob-
jective is to interpret the contract provision in question and produce a result
that is equitable and just. They all use established standards of interpreta-
tion to help give meaning to the language of the provision and arrive at a
decision. In some cases, such as in the hockey grievance, this involved in-
terpreting only a few words. In the baseball grievances, Roberts and Nico-
lau dealt with an entire section of the collective bargaining agreement.
However, in all three decisions, the same standards of interpretation were
used: the meaning of the language itself, the bargaining history and prior
practices of the parties, the context within which the grievance arose, and
the avoidance of an absurd or nonsensical result.
Standards of interpretation are but "aids" to be used by the arbitrator.
These three decisions are good examples of the standards being used to sus-
tain a particular interpretation as a viable alternative. The standards pro-
vide support for the meaning assigned by the arbitrator as a possible and
reasonable interpretation. It is the ultimate task of the arbitrator to find the
interpretation that is not only reasonable, as supported by standards, but
also the most equitable and just given the context of the grievance. In pro-
fessional sports arbitration awards, the arbitrator needs to rely on the con-
text of the grievance to provide the guidelines within which a particular
decision must fall. Given the complexity of issues surrounding professional
sports today, context is the main source of justice for the arbitrator. If
standards of interpretation are the tools by which an arbitrator forges a just
and equitable resolution to a dispute, then the use of context is the arbitra-
tor's biggest and most effective tool.
JAMES GILBERT RAPPIS
149. Id. at 33.
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